“Automatic” first-offender pardon: Both the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 and the state’s criminal code recognize a second type of pardon for some convicted felons - the so-called “automatic” first-offender pardon.
The second sentence of Article 4, Section 5(E)(1) of the constitution states that a “first offender convicted of a non-violent crime, or convicted of aggravated battery, second degree battery, aggravated assault, mingling harmful substances, aggravated criminal damage to property, purse snatching, extortion or illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities never previously convicted of a felony shall be pardoned automatically upon completion of his sentence, without a recommendation of the Board of Pardons and without action by the governor.”
The statutory equivalent of this provision is La. R.S. 15:572(B), which states that “a first
offender never previously convicted of a felony shall be pardoned automatically upon completion of his sentence without a recommendation of the Board of Pardons and without action by the governor.”
In this instance, “first offender” is defined in 15:572 (c) as meaning anyone convicted in Louisiana of a felony, “but never previously convicted of a felony within this state or convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States or of any foreign government or country of a crime which, if committed in this state, would have been a felony, regardless of any previous conviction for any misdemeanors.”
This type of pardon has been recognized by Louisiana courts as restoring the basic rights of citizenship discussed in Art. 1, Sec. 20 of the state constitution. These include the right to vote, the right to work, the right to hold public office, and the right to possess firearms (subject, of course, to 14:95.1 restrictions). However, the “automatic” type of pardon does not restore the status of innocence conferred by a gubernatorial pardon. State v. Adams, 355 So. 2d 917, n3 922 (1978).
At its most basic level, this type of pardon appears to be almost administrative in function. La. R.S. 15:572(D) states that, upon the day an individual completes his sentence, “the Division of Probation and Parole of the Department of Corrections, after satisfying itself that (1) the individual is a first offender as defined herein and (2) the individual has completed his sentence shall issue a certificate recognizing and proclaiming that the petitioner is fully pardoned for the offense and that he has all the rights of citizenship and franchise, and shall transmit a copy of the certificate to the individual and to the clerk of court in and for the parish where the conviction occurred.”
There are several considerations that go along with this type of pardon. Besides restoring just the rights (and not the privileges) of citizenship, it is also a one-time-only affair. La. R.S.
15:572(D).
In addition, this type of pardon does not wipe the slate clean, as would a gubernatorial pardon; the status of “innocence,” thus, is not restored. State v. Adams, 355 So.2d 917, n3 922 (1978). In the event of a future conviction, a person pardoned under Art. 1, Sec. 20 of the Constitution, as well as under La. R.S. 15:572(B), could have the previously pardoned conviction considered in adjudicating the person as a multiple offender.
A review of the language of both the constitutional provisions and state law regarding “automatic” first-offender pardons suggests that a person convicted of a non-violent crime (which really doesn’t include many 14:95:1 offenses) or of one of the 14:95.1 crimes mentioned in the second sentence of Art. 4 Sec. 5(E)(1) of the state constitution – aggravated battery, second degree battery, aggravated assault, mingling harmful substances, aggravated criminal damage to property, purse snatching, extortion, or illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities may avail themselves of this type of pardon, which would restore the right to legally own a gun. Those convicted of the majority of crimes listed in La. R.S. 14:95.1, however, would probably have little luck availing themselves of this type of pardon as a means of restoring gun ownership rights.
Indeed, the state Supreme Court, in State v. Wiggins, 432 So.2d 234 (1983), ruled that La. R.S. 14:95.1 does not exist in opposition to the first-offender pardon provision, and that it may still preclude someone who receives an “automatic” first-offender pardon from legally owning a weapon. In this case, the Supreme Court said that it is within the state’s right to use its police power to limit the “rights of citizenship” normally restored by an “automatic pardon.” In Wiggins, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the prohibitions contained in La. R.S. 14:95.1
still applied to a person who received an automatic pardon. Their reasoning was simple: the “automatic pardon” did not erase the fact that the defendant had been convicted of a serious crime, nor did it change his status as a convicted felon.
Therefore, while it does restore the basic rights of citizenship, this type of pardon might not be very helpful to a person convicted of an offense enumerated under La. R. S. 14:95.1. However, there are still a few other options available under La. R. S. 14:95.1 for those convicted of a crime enumerated under that statute.
The second sentence of Article 4, Section 5(E)(1) of the constitution states that a “first offender convicted of a non-violent crime, or convicted of aggravated battery, second degree battery, aggravated assault, mingling harmful substances, aggravated criminal damage to property, purse snatching, extortion or illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities never previously convicted of a felony shall be pardoned automatically upon completion of his sentence, without a recommendation of the Board of Pardons and without action by the governor.”
The statutory equivalent of this provision is La. R.S. 15:572(B), which states that “a first
offender never previously convicted of a felony shall be pardoned automatically upon completion of his sentence without a recommendation of the Board of Pardons and without action by the governor.”
In this instance, “first offender” is defined in 15:572 (c) as meaning anyone convicted in Louisiana of a felony, “but never previously convicted of a felony within this state or convicted under the laws of any other state or of the United States or of any foreign government or country of a crime which, if committed in this state, would have been a felony, regardless of any previous conviction for any misdemeanors.”
This type of pardon has been recognized by Louisiana courts as restoring the basic rights of citizenship discussed in Art. 1, Sec. 20 of the state constitution. These include the right to vote, the right to work, the right to hold public office, and the right to possess firearms (subject, of course, to 14:95.1 restrictions). However, the “automatic” type of pardon does not restore the status of innocence conferred by a gubernatorial pardon. State v. Adams, 355 So. 2d 917, n3 922 (1978).
At its most basic level, this type of pardon appears to be almost administrative in function. La. R.S. 15:572(D) states that, upon the day an individual completes his sentence, “the Division of Probation and Parole of the Department of Corrections, after satisfying itself that (1) the individual is a first offender as defined herein and (2) the individual has completed his sentence shall issue a certificate recognizing and proclaiming that the petitioner is fully pardoned for the offense and that he has all the rights of citizenship and franchise, and shall transmit a copy of the certificate to the individual and to the clerk of court in and for the parish where the conviction occurred.”
There are several considerations that go along with this type of pardon. Besides restoring just the rights (and not the privileges) of citizenship, it is also a one-time-only affair. La. R.S.
15:572(D).
In addition, this type of pardon does not wipe the slate clean, as would a gubernatorial pardon; the status of “innocence,” thus, is not restored. State v. Adams, 355 So.2d 917, n3 922 (1978). In the event of a future conviction, a person pardoned under Art. 1, Sec. 20 of the Constitution, as well as under La. R.S. 15:572(B), could have the previously pardoned conviction considered in adjudicating the person as a multiple offender.
A review of the language of both the constitutional provisions and state law regarding “automatic” first-offender pardons suggests that a person convicted of a non-violent crime (which really doesn’t include many 14:95:1 offenses) or of one of the 14:95.1 crimes mentioned in the second sentence of Art. 4 Sec. 5(E)(1) of the state constitution – aggravated battery, second degree battery, aggravated assault, mingling harmful substances, aggravated criminal damage to property, purse snatching, extortion, or illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities may avail themselves of this type of pardon, which would restore the right to legally own a gun. Those convicted of the majority of crimes listed in La. R.S. 14:95.1, however, would probably have little luck availing themselves of this type of pardon as a means of restoring gun ownership rights.
Indeed, the state Supreme Court, in State v. Wiggins, 432 So.2d 234 (1983), ruled that La. R.S. 14:95.1 does not exist in opposition to the first-offender pardon provision, and that it may still preclude someone who receives an “automatic” first-offender pardon from legally owning a weapon. In this case, the Supreme Court said that it is within the state’s right to use its police power to limit the “rights of citizenship” normally restored by an “automatic pardon.” In Wiggins, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the prohibitions contained in La. R.S. 14:95.1
still applied to a person who received an automatic pardon. Their reasoning was simple: the “automatic pardon” did not erase the fact that the defendant had been convicted of a serious crime, nor did it change his status as a convicted felon.
Therefore, while it does restore the basic rights of citizenship, this type of pardon might not be very helpful to a person convicted of an offense enumerated under La. R. S. 14:95.1. However, there are still a few other options available under La. R. S. 14:95.1 for those convicted of a crime enumerated under that statute.